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Abstract 
Housing delivery within South Africa, and specifically the Eastern Cape, is constrained by 
a variety of pressing issues. Significant nation-wide barriers include fiscal decentralization, 
supply  driven  inefficiencies,  non-sustainability  and  bureaucratic  failure.  More  specific 
factors and trends are highlighted through juxtaposing the normative policy aims with 
two case study assessments of local municipalities. These various instances of politico-
economic failure appear to be bypassed via social housing initiatives; however, theoretical 
and practical recommendations lend themselves towards the immediate renewal of the 
current housing program. 
 
DUE TO THE ECONOMIC, social, and political significance of state housing within 
South  Africa  it  is  necessary  to  juxtapose  the  policy  aims  with  the  tangible  reality  of 
delivery  and  highlight  any  divergences  therein.  The  provision  of  secure  housing,  as 
enshrined by the Constitution, has a critical role to play in terms of social transformation, 
poverty alleviation, and economic stimulation. However, there are several key challenges 
which present themselves as obstacles to these objectives and the delivery of quality and 
sustainable housing. 
The  economic  framework  used  for  analysis  is  largely  centred  on  public  finance; 
however, traces of development economics are present throughout. These two schools of 
theory are critical if housing policy and the inherent breakdowns are to be holistically 
understood.  The  specific  question,  which  this  paper  seeks  to  answer,  pertains to  the 
inability of local municipalities to convert substantial government funding into tangible 
and successful housing projects. More specifically, the paper aims to identify and explore 
the root causes which lead to the widespread fiscal and bureaucratic failure within the 
Eastern Cape housing structures.   
The theoretical and legislative grounding, explored in the initial sections, are combined 
with a case study approach in an effort to realistically inform and criticize the literature. 
The two case-studies were carefully chosen, taking into consideration the demographic 
context of the Eastern Cape: on the one hand Kouga Local Municipality represents a 
growth region, whereas Ngqushwa Local Municipality‟s dwindling population is indicative 
of rural-urban migration. The actual implementation of federal structures, fiscal spending, 
top-down project administration, and economic realism are all compared and contrasted 
with the relevant theory in order to highlight problematic areas of divergence.   
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Adequate housing, delivered both to standard and on time, has the potential to create 
safe, cohesive, and thriving communities (de Nobrega, 2007: 5). But, it is first necessary 
to ensure that fiscal policy and structuring are sound and that these are coupled with 
effective communication, managerial, and bureaucratic channels. The Eastern Cape, to 
date, has been unable to realize these criteria and various inefficiencies within housing 
provision have subsequently arisen.  
As a result, the provincial and nationwide housing backlog has escalated to substantial 
proportions. If government is sincere in its promise to mass deliver houses to the people, 
an  efficient  allocation  of  resources  needs  to  be  achieved.  Departments  need  to  be 
adequately staffed and funded, projects need to align with strict standards and regulations, 
and instances of corruption and bureaucratic failure need to be eradicated. Both human 
and capital resources need to be directed effectively at fast and efficient housing delivery, 
keeping in mind an environment whereby the demand for housing is constantly on the 
increase. 
 
1. CURRENT PROJECTS, TRENDS, AND STATISTICS WITHIN EASTERN CAPE HOUSING 
 
Ushered in along with Tokyo Sexwale‟s Human Settlements Administration has been a 
no-nonsense approach towards budget underspending. The example of the Eastern Cape, 
underspending its 2008/09 housing budget by 49.3% (returning R543m of the initial 
R1,05bn  budget),  supports  Prud‟homme‟s  (1995:  208)  claim  that  local  governments 
should not be assigned fiscal responsibilities (Finweek, 2009: 13). The argument that fiscal 
functions  should  remain  centralized  gains  momentum  here  as  provincial  jurisdictions 
seem unable to achieve fiscal efficiency. As a result, even with optimistic forecasts, the 
2009 budget is also expected to be underspent albeit at a lower figure of 16% (Finweek, 
2009: 13). 2009/2010 state housing finance within the region has unsurprisingly fallen, 
experiencing a 2.9% decline as a result of several widespread and unresolved problem 
areas (discussed below) (Finweek, 2009: 13). 
Along with the Eastern Cape Housing Department‟s significant vacancy rate, some 
63%, several other barriers are glaringly apparent (Finweek, 2009: 13). Many of these 
appear to be structural, captured by the 2008/09 Budget Policy Speech‟s emphasis on 
streamlining  roles  and  responsibilities  between  the  Province  and  municipalities, 
enhancing capacity to deliver at a local level, and contractor relations (Daily Dispatch, 
2008: 6). Bird (1990: 281) clearly mirrors these concerns within the literature, identifying 
the importance of both the vertical and horizontal development of the public sector. Care 
must be taken, however, not to overlook the more tangible issues of project finance, 
infrastructure, service delivery, housing quality, and regional sustainability as these also 
fall within the scope of fiscal federalism (Finweek, 2009: 13). Thus, a brief overview of 
the housing delivery value chain and the actual functions performed by the specific role-
players is necessary before a more detailed case study analysis can proceed. 
In terms of highlighting managerial and structural inefficiencies within the housing 
framework, essentially Black et al’s (2005: 77-79) version of bureaucratic failure, a brief 
discussion of the Tarkastad Housing Project proves adequate. The Tarkastad example, 
whereby approximately 600 people are confined to waiting lists while an RDP housing 
project stands empty, embodies the general weaknesses in the functioning of government 




attributed this failure to planning, coordination, monitoring and reporting mechanisms 
(Cull, 2009: 2). There is an obvious disjuncture in planning between provincial and local 
government which inevitably leads to unavoidable problems in the hand-over phase. The 
town of Tarkastad is yet another victim of rural-urban migration but despite this, and 
assurances that unoccupied homes would be redistributed, citizens who were amongst the 
initial 1000 registered beneficiaries still have no access to secure housing (Broken Homes, 
2009). The claim that local authorities (as opposed to a national supervisory body) have 
increased capacity and a greater understanding of the dynamics on the ground, in this 
case,  seems  unfounded  with  corruption  (a  Special  Investigations  Unit  probe  being 
conducted in 2005), a lack of political will and leadership, and poor planning all serving to 
undermine several housing projects within the province (Cull, 2008: 2). 
Furthermore, it was noted as far back as 2002 by Housing and Local Government 
Department MEC, Gugile Nkwinti, that there was the unequivocal need to make the 
switch from supply-driven to demand-driven housing (Maqhina, 2002: 5). Renaud (1998: 
758) justifies this through a three-pronged reference to areas where the economic theory 
found demand-side subsidies to be superior to supply-side subsidies: deadweight losses in 
consumer welfare; losses of consumer sovereignty; and the comparative resource cost of 
providing access to housing through housing allowances against the direct provision of a 
physical unit. Thus it is necessary, according to Nkwinti, to avoid the scenario where 
finance  dictates  the  number  of  houses  as  opposed  to  the  alternative  of  demand 
dependent planning aimed at achieving integrated development (Maqhina, 2002: 5). The 
Eastern Cape recently attempted to draw on the external expertise of other provinces in 
an attempt to address (under the same supply-driven framework) the housing provision 
figures which plummeted from 37 000 units in 2005 to 11 750 by the end of the 2007 
financial year (Maqhina, 2008: 4). 
Similarly, the deep-seated problem of quality can be addressed by making reference to 
the Venterstad Housing Project and the width versus depth debate raised by Charlton 
(2004:  6).  Essentially,  hundreds  of  residents  deserted  their  RDP  homes  due  to  poor 
quality construction and dangerous living conditions (Broken Homes, 2009). This is not 
an isolated instance, with thousands of RDP houses across the province having been 
rejected by beneficiaries as a direct result of sub-standard quality. Common complaints, 
such as that by Zanexolo Mbeka, include “big cracks on the walls that you could even see 
through standing outside, the floor had no cement and the doors and windows were also 
coming  off”  (Broken  Homes,  2009).  Beyond  the  more  obvious  qualitative  criticisms, 
Timse  (2009:  4)  also  noted  that  the  residents  of  Zwide  and  Verplaas  had  lodged 
complaints pertaining to plot size and the cramped nature of the housing development. 
In 2007 alone the province had approximately 60 housing projects, and within these 20 
000 homes were found to be defective with estimated repair costs amounting to R304 
million  (Matavire,  2007:  4).  Figure  1  records  the  overall  repair  costs,  and  gives  an 
indication of the magnitude of the problem on a municipal scale. Charlton (2004: 6) 
would claim that the provision of a small number of complete houses (scope) is superior 
to the alternative of a large number of relatively crude houses (scale). The high incidence 
of  blocked  projects  also  adds  to  growing  quality  concerns,  with  structures  gradually 

























































Figure 1: Cost of Rebuilding Poor Quality Houses by District. 
Source: Broken Homes, 2009. 
 
In  addition,  the  Seymour  Housing  Project  failed  to  take  into  consideration  the 
guidelines  and  minimum  standards  forwarded  by  Arrigone  (1994:  6).  Little  to  no 
information was acquired regarding the specifics of the town or its then current housing 
condition, leading to sustainability concerns similar to those cited by Ebsen and Ramboll 
(2000) and Charlton (2004). The RDP houses in Seymour are referred to as “holiday 
homes” by the remaining residents, as many of the beneficiaries have moved away to the 
surrounding cities in the hope of finding employment (Broken Homes, 2009). The town 
has steadily been receding, with the result that many of the few who have stayed behind 
are living in the grips of poverty with no real hope of ever securing a regular income 
(Broken  Homes,  2009).  Hence,  it  is  essential  to  properly  plan  an  integrated  housing 
development with the view to achieving long-term sustainability. Seymour, from once 
having profitable banks, petrol stations, furniture shops, a tobacco factory, butchery and 
supermarket, now survives on the employment and income generated from only four 
shops (Broken Homes, 2009). So, despite the assurances of government advocates that 
housing  developments  are  geared  towards  the  development  of  social  and  economic 
infrastructure, it is arguable that these housing projects – through harbouring criminals 
and draining fiscal resources – are more costly than they are beneficial. 
Moreover,  a  dual  analysis  of  the  housing  developments  at  Burgersdorp  and 
Sweetwaters serve to isolate the equally pressing obstacles of infrastructure and service 
delivery. Rather than local governments being in an optimal position to serve the needs 
of specific regions, as was argued by Wehner (2000: 49), these sub-national authorities 
appear  to  be  incapable  of  managing  redistributive  projects.  Despite  the  houses  at 
Sweetwaters having been completed and handed over more than 5 years ago, residents 
are still waiting to receive water and electricity from government (Broken Homes, 2009). 
On the other hand, the RDP houses in Burgersdorp are situated amongst rubble and 




Homes, 2009). The previous owners of these houses, ordered demolished by the state, 
found themselves taking refuge for several months in state-sponsored cardboard shelters 
due  to  the  lack  of  an  emergency  housing  plan  and  support  infrastructure  within  the 
district (Broken Homes, 2009). 
Finally, contractor, payment and financial worries arise from the Maclear Housing 
Development. As was suggested by Khan and Thurman (2001: 10), state housing seems 
to be reliant on large developers due to their  legitimacy, financial independence, and 
ability to achieve economies of scale. Construction of 250 RDP houses halted abruptly in 
2004 when contractors (a small and emerging firm) claimed the municipality ceased all 
payments R2.8 million short of completion cost (Broken Homes, 2009). The project was 
officially  classified  as  blocked  due  to  the  contractor  not  being  registered  with  the 
department and the absence (at the time) of a satisfactory contractor policy; but unofficial 
reasons include slow and inadequate payment as a result of extended verification periods 
(Matavire, 2007: 4). Songoni has proposed relying on the expertise and capital mobility of 
large private companies as a short-term solution to these problems. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The public sector, according to Oates (1994: 126), is comprised of a set of multilevel 
institutions. Within this multilevel schema, state government is responsible for matters of 
national  concern  whereas  provincial  legislations  are  entrusted  with  the  fiscal 
responsibilities of their specific geographical regions (Oates, 1994: 126). From here, it is 
obvious that fiscal functions may, in several important ways, overlap. Thus, Oates (1994: 
126) deems it vital for a sound policy to be formed regarding the jurisdiction of each level 
of  government,  the  efficient  allocation  of  state  funds,  and  the  vertical  delegation  of 
regulatory responsibilities. 
Similarly, Bird (1990: 281) adds to the theory on fiscal federalism by identifying the 
importance of both vertical (between levels of government) and horizontal (within levels) 
development to an overall efficient public sector. Although centralized government is 
preferred in terms of national finances, there are certain areas where local fiscal choice 
would prove to be the most advantageous policy. As Fjeldstad (2001: 4) identifies, in 
practice  redistributive  policies  are  often  the  responsibility  of  decentralized  levels  of 
government. It is the case in less developed countries, especially in the African sub-
Saharan context, that sub-national service provision is often the only tool for providing 
in-kind transfers to the more poverty stricken households and regions.  
Thus, it is the particular redistributive and allocative needs of local economies that 
sub-national governments would be best suited to handle (Quigley, 2007: 2). Oates (1994: 
129) had provided an explanation for the choice of sub-national governments by drawing 
on  the  difficulties  encountered  by  central  governments  when  differentiating  between 
separate regions due to use of broader economic instruments. 
However, the rationale that local governments are able to achieve a better match of 
supply and demand conditions as well as promote an environment of healthy competition 
faces  three  crippling  objections  posed  by  Prud‟homme  (1995).  The  first  of  these 
objections is that the real issue in developing countries is not with detailed taste and 
preference functions, but rather with the satisfaction of basic needs (Prud‟homme, 1995: 




conditions by voting with their feet (leaving the area) is flawed as it is often the case that 
this  is  not  a  viable  option  due  to  the  poorly  functioning  land  and  labour  markets 
(Prud‟homme, 1995: 208). Lastly, yet no less important, is that bureaucrats and officials, 
when not poorly trained, unresponsive, and unmotivated, are often constrained by the 
available resources (Prud‟homme, 1995: 208).   
Upon further analysis, it appears evident that decentralization is severely more limited 
within the context of developing countries. When the different tiers of government are 
separated it is not only more difficult to implement economic policy, but the independent 
jurisdictions are now provided with an incentive to adopt unsustainable public policies 
with  the  assurance  that  the  central  government  will  act  as  a  lender  of  last  resort 
(Fjeldstad, 2001: 4).  
However, both Wehner (2000: 49) and Oates (1994: 129) do not entirely rule out the 
ability of local governments to assist the poor. What arises is that there needs to be a 
sharing of the Distribution Function by both central and sub-national authorities (Oates, 
1994:  129).  The  argument  pivots  around  central  government  establishing  a  set  of 
rules/parameters,  and  from  there  local  governments  can  manoeuvre  within  these 
confines to address their areas of specific need (Oates, 1994: 129). Wehner (2000: 49) 
suggests that the jurisdiction wielding control over the smallest geographic area would be 
able to best internalize the costs and benefits of a public good or service whereas central 
government has both the size and ability to overcome overlapping geographical disputes 
and make use of economies of scale. Hence, it would appear fiscal responsibility is by no 
means  mutually  exclusive  –  rather  it  should  take  the  form  of  a  joint  state/sub-state 
venture. 
Nevertheless, as Oates (1994: 146) highlights, it is important to be wary of Niskanen 
behaviour at the local level. In an attempt by politicians and public officials, via inefficient 
means, to maximize the size of their budgets standards fall, efficiency is forfeit and the 
interests of dissident or minority groups tend to be ignored (Oates, 1994: 146). On the 
other hand, however, it is also inefficient to expect all regions to comply with the same 
rules and standards (Oates, 1994: 146). Here, the costs of attempting to comply (with no 
feasible  cost-benefit  calculation  guiding  the  target  levels)  can  be  significant  and 
detrimental to not only the region but also to the state as a whole (Oates, 1994: 147). 
Friedman  and  Weinberg  (1983:  7)  draw  on  the  conclusive  example  of  the 
Experimental  Housing  Allowance  Program  (EHAP,  1973)  to  claim  that  demand-side 
housing  allowances  are  superior  to  supply-side  subsidies  from  both  a  social  and  an 
economic perspective. From EHAP research Renaud (1998: 757) concluded: “targeted 
beneficiaries do not have a housing problem so much as they have an income problem. 
Demand-side  subsidies  were  found  superior  to  supply-side  subsidies  (in  the  form  of 
government  provided  housing)  on  three  accounts:  deadweight  losses  in  consumer 
welfare; losses of consumer sovereignty; and the comparative resource cost of providing 
access to housing through housing allowances against the direct provision of a physical 
unit” (Renaud, 1998: 758). And it is from here that the review progresses. 
Arrigone  (1994),  in  conjunction  with  the  Southern  African  Development  Bank 
(DBSA), assessed project funding and feasibility from a regional perspective. Within the 
study, appropriate guidelines were proposed for the planning and preparation of housing 
projects. The first of these guidelines is rather obvious: acquisition of information from 




(Arrigone,  1994:  6).  The  identification  and  assessment  of  a  possible  housing  project 
needs, as the DBSA emphasizes, a set of realistic minimum standards so as to avoid 
unsustainable projects and an inefficient allocation of resources (Arrigone, 1994: 6). The 
need for housing is able to by-pass any of the social agendas via adopting a twofold 
quantitative assessment – based on population growth and the need to eliminate housing 
backlogs (Arrigone, 1994: 6). 
Moreover, the project needs to be affordable for both state and the relevant target 
income group – “the monthly amount that an average household should be expected to 
set aside for the repayment of a housing mortgage is an issue that concerns planners, 
economists  and  decision  makers”  (Arrigone,  1994:  13).  Consequently,  the  realities  of 
South Africa‟s specific populations become an important factor and housing policy needs 
to cater for the range of affordabilities (Arrigone, 1994: 13). 
In addition, housing projects need to play a central role in supporting the livelihoods 
of  its  new  residents  (Charlton,  2004:  4).  Charlton  (2004:  4)  provides  two  clarifying 
examples:  the  first  is  a  well  located  state  housing  development  in  an  inner-city 
environment which confers upon some of its residents the ability (due to zero transport 
costs) the opportunity to run a successful vendor business; the second example is a rural 
plot which has the spatial dimensions to allow for a subsistence vegetable garden to be 
established. In both of these cases, beyond the simplistic structure of the house and what 
it tangibly is, the house adds significant value to the lives of its residents (Charlton, 2004: 
4). 
To provide another layer of normative clarity to the argument, Ebsen and Ramboll 
(2000: 3) forward economic sustainability as a crucial component of a housing project. 
Charlton (2004: 4) links the success of a housing project to its ability to provide income-
generating activities. Therefore, locational issues become key as they (by its situation with 
regard to schools, hospitals, etc.) are able to overcome the problem of homelessness as 
well as determine the work opportunities of residents (Charlton, 2004: 4). Cost factors 
need to be considered as land value is a built-in cost component of the state funded 
project (Charlton, 2004: 11). Thus, the costs to government need to be weighed against 
the economic benefits citizens will gain in terms of affordably being able to access their 
working environments (Charlton, 2004: 11). 
Due to the idea that state housing should be an asset to both the individual as well as 
the authorities, social housing units need to be assessed before a thorough investigation 
can be claimed. As Charlton (2004: 4) made clear, a housing project should be an asset to 
the beneficiary; but more than this also to the authorities in terms of rate generation and 
basically  avoiding  financial  drain  on  the  city  (in  the  form  of  maintenance  and 
management costs). Social housing has been viewed, within the literature and through 
empirical evidence, as a sustainable solution to human settlement issues (Draft Social 
Housing Policy, 2003: 3).  
Lastly, Charlton (2004: 13) highlights the urgent need to link housing projects with the 
long-term  economic  need  of  its  beneficiaries.  Housing  developments,  according  to 
Charlton (2004: 13) should be “places of opportunity” – beyond just the delivery process 
and the short-to-medium-term creation of jobs in the construction sector. Beyond this, 
housing projects need to be coupled with training programs and initiatives which aim to 
empower and enable the community so as to turn massive fiscal projects into sustainable 




Within a state funded housing project, there are undoubtedly constraints in terms of 
realizing socio-economic distribution within the confines of fiscal parameters. Disputes 
have occurred regarding the width versus depth debate: which essentially juxtapose the 
deliverance of a small number of complete and quality houses with the dichotic outcome 
of a large number of relatively crude houses (Charlton, 2004: 6). Following from this 
disjuncture, Khan and Thurman (2001: 10) find that in either case the state seems to be 
reliant on large developers since, in the case of both quantity and quality of housing, 
economies of scale are essential in the provision of affordable housing. Although the 
alternative approaches of community self-help projects and NGO-driven developments 
have  convincing  arguments  in  their  favour,  related  time-consuming  and  process-
orientated  methods  seem  to  place  them  beyond  the  feasible  reach  of  nation-wide 
implementation (Khan and Thurman, 2001: 11). 
Over and above the issue of policy formulation, government failure - in the form of 
political and bureaucratic failure – can lead to fiscal inefficiencies (Black et al, 2005: 77). 
Politicians  exploit the  ignorance  of  voters  and tend  to  adopt popular  as opposed  to 
appropriate policies in a bid to maximize support (Black et al, 2005: 77). Bureaucrats then, 
following what Black et al (2005: 79) refer to as a rational course of behaviour, make use 
of the political channels afforded to them in an effort to maximize their utility; usually 
manifest in the housing sector by the misallocation of funds (a means to try and increase 
budget allowances) and building projects awarded on the grounds of biased selection. 
Miscommunication,  mismanagement,  corruption,  ill-founded  assumptions,  and  red 
tape  all  combine  to  further  hinder  fiscal  success  (Khan  and  Thurman,  2001:  11-18). 
Along  with  this  many  housing  subsidies  remain  constant  and  fail  to  take  into 
consideration the effects of inflation, increasing land values, infrastructure provision and 
are essentially characterized by confusion regarding property rights and a lack of vision 
and creativity on the part of policy planners (Khan and Thurman, 2001: 18-19). 
 
3. THE AIMS AND VISION OF STATE HOUSING 
 
In  terms  of  outlining  the  normative  nature  of  South  Africa‟s  housing  policy, 
government‟s  official  vision  and  mission  statement  prove  to  be  useful  points  of 
departure.  Within  the  overarching  vision,  emphasis  has  been  placed  strongly  on 
“sustainable human settlements with access to socio-economic infrastructure” (Housing 
Mandate,  2009).  Such  considerations  echo  Charlton‟s  (2004:  4)  recommendation  that 
projects be economically sustainable and play a central role in supporting the livelihoods 
of residents. Similar sentiments are reiterated by the Department of Housing‟s mission 
statement: “To establish and facilitate a sustainable process that provides equitable access 
to adequate housing for all within the context of affordability of housing and services and 
access to social and economic opportunities” (Housing Mandate, 2009). 
Furthermore, section 2 of the Housing Act (Act No. 107, 1997) centres the realization 
of  these  promises  on  the  successful  integration  of  government,  provincial,  and  local 
departments. Established here, in the hope that economic viability can be simultaneously 
integrated with state housing provision, is the need for all three spheres of government to 
interact effectively and coordinate housing initiatives. Also captured within this document 
is  the  need  for  good  governance,  seen  through  the  reiteration  of  transparency, 




discussed by Oates (1994: 129), necessarily requires the careful allocation of jurisdictions 
and sound managerial capacity if it is to prove successful.  
Despite the growing urban demographic of South Africa, government has remained 
committed to fairly distributed housing patterns as it is argued that population growth 
will  result  in  a  „numerically  stable  rural  population‟  (Housing  Whitepaper,  1994:  5). 
Specifically, within these economically capped rural districts housing has been identified 
as  a  tangible  means  towards  improving  the  quality  of  peoples  lives  (South  Africa 
Yearbook,  2007/08).  Once  again  closely  mapping  the  literature  on  economic 
empowerment  and  sustainability  (Charlton,  2003),  the  Eastern  Cape  Department  of 
Human Settlements has taken care to note that the provision of shelter alone is not 
sufficient in order to meaningfully improve the lives of rural populations (Mabandla, 
2009: 2). 
Hence,  what  is  required  is  a  shift  from  an  essentially  single-sector  approach  to  a 
dynamic multi-sector approach (Mabandla, 2009: 2). In order to concretize this, Mabandla 
(2009: 2) is quoted as saying that “the achievement of sustainable communities will not 
see light when housing delivery continues to be isolated from other assets and services 
that are key to sustain the livelihoods of communities”. Unsurprisingly, a similar holistic 
view to housing provision was enshrined within the 1994 Housing Whitepaper (1994: 8). 
Government did take cognizance of the arduous task at hand, making reference to 
service backlogs and the almost insatiable demand for state sponsored houses (Housing 
Whitepaper, 1994: 9). Unlike Renaud (1998: 757), however, government has overlooked 
any  possible  shift  from  the  supply-side  framework  to  a  people  driven  demand-side 
approach. Subsequently, despite Arrigone‟s (1994: 6) need-based fiscal allocation method 
(demand-side) not influencing policy, the far-reaching geographical disparities have been 
factored in along with the reality of a multitude of low-income households and their 
specific needs (Housing Whitepaper, 1994: 9). Mabandla (2009: 2) thus highlights the 
need for effective coordination (both horizontal and vertical) within the delivery process, 
and  stresses  the  Housing  Departments  commitment  to  quality  and  the  accelerated 
provision of housing. 
In light of these considerations, government introduced the Comprehensive Housing 
Plan in 2004. The plan essentially spanned a five year period, terminating at the end of 
2009 (South Africa Yearbook, 2007/08). The plan aimed to achieve the formation of a 
single formal housing market, the acceleration of delivery, and to transform the spatial 
characteristics of housing into non-racial settlements (South Africa Yearbook, 2007/08). 
The plan also had several secondary objectives, including the diversification of housing 
stock (rental and social housing), community creation, and ensuring that property and 
house holdings were transformed into an asset for wealth creation and empowerment. 
Reverting back to the spatial characteristics of housing developments, government 
expressed various concerns (and made attempts to rectify these) regarding the geographic 
locations of many of the housing and infrastructure developments. The main concern, as 
mentioned earlier, deals directly with the sustainability of human settlements and the 
livelihoods  of  the  people  staying  there  (Housing  Atlas,  2005:  2).  Beyond  a  lack  of 
economic opportunities, the Housing Atlas (2005: 2) suggests immediate focus needs to 
be placed upon the provision of social, cultural, and recreational facilities as well as the 
provision of suitable housing. The Housing Atlas (2005), which maps the framework for 




terms of both need and potential for economic growth; going so far as to prioritize skills 
development over huge infrastructure development. 
On the other hand, government‟s housing vision extends its centralized supervisory 
mandate to include broader fiscal oversight and financial monitoring (focusing chiefly on 
corporate loans and mortgages). One of the legislative bodies found here is the Home 
Loan and Mortgage Disclosure Act 2000, which aims to monitor the financial institutions 
serving  the  housing-credit  needs  of  communities  (South  Africa  Yearbook,  2007/08). 
Through  such  a  supervisory  process,  government hopes  to  eradicate  traces  of  unfair 
practices  and  ensure  non-discriminatory  access  for  all  citizens  to  loan-services  and 
financing (South Africa Yearbook, 2007/08). In addition, initiatives have been launched 
in order to make available housing-finance products and subsidies from the Department 
of Housing (South Africa Yearbook, 2007/08). 
The  above qualitative  goals  were  legislatively  enshrined  in  the  1997 Housing  Act, 
along with verbalized aims to meet quantitative targets like the provision of a million 
houses by 1999 (Khan & Thurman, 2001: 3). Promises of access to permanent residential 
structures  with  secure  tenure,  the  assurance  of  privacy,  the  provision  of  adequate 
protection  against  the  elements,  potable  water,  sanitary  conditions  and  domestic 
electricity  supply  have  provided  the  African  National  Congress  (ANC)  with  much 
popular support. But, it remains to be seen whether these pipe-dreams have yet been 
realized. 
 
4. CASE STUDY: KOUGA LOCAL MUNICIPALITY 
 
By  way  of  an  introduction,  Khanya-aicdd  (2008:  5)  place  Kouga  local  municipality 
approximately 20km west of Port Elizabeth and within the municipality‟s jurisdiction lies 
Patensie,  Hankey,  Jeffreys  Bay,  St  Francis,  Humansdorp,  Oyster  Bay,  Andrieskraal, 
Loerie, and Thornhill. Kouga local municipality was chosen for study as a result of its 
interesting population and housing dynamics: an expanding population coupled with an 
increased demand for housing and a growing reliance on informal settlements. 
Within the Kouga local municipality, the nature of both the supply and demand for 
housing act as a qualitative as well as a quantitative delivery barrier. The supply-driven 
framework, aimed at the new mandate of reducing informal settlements, stands in stark 
contrast to the expressed needs of the residents. It needs to be noted that residents have 
expressed a desire for housing provision to be hierarchically structured, tailored towards 
the need and demand of the citizens rather than on political goals or agendas. A focused 














Table 1: Focused Group Discussion Ward 7 – Hankey. 
 
Key Issues  Comments 
1. Slow Delivery  Sometimes we have to wait 3 years or even longer for a house. 
When you get your house depends when you applied, it is more difficult if you applied late. 
There has been delivery but it has been too slow. 
We need houses to be delivered every year and there always seems to be a huge delay before 
projects begin. They should begin immediately. 
They must spend budgets immediately as we need houses. Why must we wait so long? 
2. Increase in 
demand 
A lot of us ex farm workers have come into Hankey to have better access to services. 
Demand is also being driven by young people moving out from their parent‟s houses. 
Some farm workers are also evicted off their farms if they can‟t pay the rent.  
3. Poor quality  Houses delivered are too small and toilets should not be in the house. We should be able to have 
a choice over the design of RDP houses e.g. 2 -3 options.  
Too small as they can not accommodate a whole family 
Overall quality of RDP houses is poor and there are cracks and the houses leak. 
The zink roofs leak and if there are strong winds the whole roof is often blown off. We need to 
secure our roofs by placing rocks on them.  
The materials used in RDP houses are very low quality. The windows and doors often break and 
we have no money to repair them.  
Need facer board to secure our roofs. 
When contractors build the units they are not always finished at the same time and often they will 
come back later to plaster etc and then we need to move out again. 
Some inspectors do not complete work to a satisfactory standard and municipal inspectors are not 
effective. 
Many of the concrete blocks used are cracked and leak. 
We would prefer brick houses as they are better looking. 
5. Other focus areas  Housing delivery should be linked to skills delivery. 
Housing and unemployment are the two major challenges in our area yet when contractors come 
to build there are only limited opportunities for work. 
Priority is given to squatters? Why? The people who have lived in the municipality for years like 
us ex-farm workers should be given preference.  
There are only informal settlements in some of the wards and they tend to get priority in terms of 
housing provision. 
Building my own home would be good for me as I am unemployed. 
Our traditional mud homes do not last long in poor whether and thus we need brick houses with 
a proper roof. We spend a lot of time repairing them.  
6. Services  Need to consider location of schools before building houses. 
We also want a nice environment with parks for our children.  
Source: Khanya-aicdd, 2008: 18. 
 
Dealing systematically with these grievances, fiscal federalism (in the form of a  split 
distribution function between central and sub-national government) has led directly to the 
slow  provision  of  housing.  As  outlined  by  Prud‟homme  (1995:  208),  unresponsive 
communication  channels  coupled  with  unmotivated  public  officials  can  often  lead  to 
delivery constraints within a decentralized system. In many instances, despite the local 
municipality having come to a prior agreement with a building contractor, the MEC‟s 
provincial housing board in Bisho has taken up to several months to sign off on the 
project  (Khanya-aicdd,  2008:  16).  Bottlenecks  thus  occur  whereby  input  costs  have 
changed  (almost  always  positively)  during  the  delay  period,  leading  to  projects  being 
blocked  as  contractors  can  no  longer  afford  to  uphold  their  contractual  agreement 
(Khanya-aicdd, 2008: 21). 
Also,  by  referring  back  to  Renaud‟s  (1998:  757-758)  supply  versus  demand-side 
debate, reliance on a supply-driven process has proved a significant barrier. An analysis of 




(2008: 4-21), coupled with a changing municipal mandate, proves useful in explaining 
this. The municipal economy is third largest in the Eastern Cape and hence 2008 research 
showed the region to be experiencing a steady influx of people. Table 2 illustrates this 
demographic trend, revealing an overall increase in the municipality‟s rural population of 
approximately 8 151 people between 1996 and 2001. Furthermore, the table translates 
this population change into a rural growth rate of 11.5% over the same 5 year period. 
This increase in population led local infrastructure to become strained, and subsequently 
the informal settlements increased in scale.  
 
Table 2: Rural Demographic Data. 
 
Demographic Area  1996  2001  Percentage Change (%) 
Hankey TLC  9 273  8 026  -15.5 
Humansdorp TLC  19 953  21 891  8.9 
Jeffreys Bay TLC  11 630  16 185  28.1 
Patensie TLC  4 442  4 268  -4.1 
St Francis TLC  1 642  2 198  25.3 
Oyster Bay LC (incl Umzamowethu)  423  342  -23.7 
Rural  15 449  17 783  13.1 
Total  62 542  70 693  11.5 
Source: Khanya-aicdd, 2008: 6. 
 
Table 3 graphically illustrates the magnitude of this informal settlement sprawl, with 
housing needs outstripping delivery and hand -over statistics by roughly 11 000 units 
(average of 5 people per house) in 2007 as compared with only 1 200 units in 2001. The 
municipality, in an effort to combat the trend through a supply-centred approach, shifted 
their priority away from a need and eligibility basis to the eradication of these settlements 
(Khanya-aicdd, 2008:  4). When the increased housing demand and priority change is 
linked with a constrained housing supply, it becomes apparent that certain populations 
(local, and often aged, farm-workers) are necessarily excluded from the process and often 
left in an extremely vulnerable position (Khanya-aicdd, 2008: 4). 
 
Table 3: Delivery of RDP Housing by Year. 
 
Year  Estimates of housing needs  Number of housing units built and handed 
over 
1994  N/A  0 
1995  N/A  N/A 
1996  N/A  380 
1997  N/A  600 
1998  N/A  764 
1999  N/A  147 
2000  5 504  N/A 
2001  6 115  150 
2002  6 576  362 
2003  7 306  187 
2004  8 118  455 
2005  9 019  335 
2006  10 022  521 
2007  10 776  507 
TOTAL  63 436  4408 





Next, the poor quality of the houses need to be addressed and attributed a root cause. 
The  immediate  explanation  is  similar  to  previous  discussions  and  stems  from  the 
Province‟s  reliance  (mandate  inflicted)  on  emerging  contractors.  Khan  and  Thurman 
(2001:  11)  argued  these  contractors  to  be  inefficient  by  way  of  time-consuming  and 
process orientated methods. Figure 2, which depicts a stair case leading to a closed wall, 
provides a concrete example of poor planning and unnecessary construction delay on the 
part of these contractors. Additionally, Khan and Thurman (2001: 10) stress that without 
the  ability  to  achieve  economies  of  scale  and  overcome  financial  difficulties  these 
contractors have been unable to deal with the system of being awarded tenders to build 
houses at a fixed cost – regardless of inflation or any unforeseen factors. The findings of 
Khanya-aicdd (2008: 21) agree with Khan and Thurman (2001) and in the event that costs 
increase, as they often do during delay periods, the only saving means available to these 
contractors is to lower both the standard and quality of their work. A common technique 
used, which is evident throughout the province in the number of crumbling and visibly 

















Figure 2: Construction Error. Hankey, Eastern Cape. 
Source: Khanya-aicdd, 2008: 10. 
 
Another dominant method used to cut costs at the expense of quality is to place 
rather than securely fix the roofing panels. Figure 3 serves to highlight this problem and 
give an indication of the aesthetic result (residents forced to secure their roofs with rocks 
and stones). Further compounding the problem is municipal housing inspectors that are 
obviously not holding contractors responsible for any poor workmanship (Khanya-aicdd, 
2008: 21). As noted figures 2 and 3 depict this situation, with a number of RDP houses 






















Figure 3: Unsecured Roofing. Hankey, Eastern Cape. 
Source: Khanya-aicdd, 2008: 10. 
 
It is also essential, if corruption and  mismanagement are to be overcome, for an 
accurate  housing  demand  database  to  be  established.  It  is  evident  that  the  supply-
orientated  housing  distribution  is  not  equitable,  seen  through  the  number  of  recent 
migrants that have been given priority over long-standing residents. An effective database 
would also be able to address many of the fraudulent claims which plague the delivery 
process, with the present screening process taking up to 6 months by which time these 
individuals  have  been  allocated  land  (Khanya-aicdd,  2008:  16).  Moreover,  a  database 
would overcome many of the planning and communication breakdowns which arise from 
the segmented and stretched federal system, finally allowing for the divergence in planned 
projects and housing backlogs to be addressed. Within Kouga itself, table 4 presents itself 
as a manifestation of the short-comings of a supply-driven process, revealing that the 
distribution  of  projects  does  not  fall  in  line  with  the  housing  backlog  figures  and  a 
number  of  Wards  have  been  entirely  neglected.  Despite  several  Wards  having  large 
housing backlogs there are no current projects underway, or even future projects planned, 
in an effort to address the problem.  
 
Table 4: Housing Backlog and Current and Approved Projects by Ward. 
 
Region  Housing Backlog  Current no. projects 
(no. of units) 
Approved projects for 2007 - 2009 
Kouga  10 766  1 037  633 
Ward 1  840  0  0 
Ward 2  2 710  0  0 
Ward 3  0  0  0 
Ward 4  2 000  607  0 
Ward 5  860  0  0 
Ward 6  860  0  0 
Ward 7  910  40  273 
Ward 8  680  0  360 
Ward 9  1 840  310  0 
Ward 10  740  80  0 





In addition, the community expressed concern that the delivery of housing was not 
linked with any form of skills transfer or development. Similarly, housing projects were 
generating little to no local employment opportunities. Charlton (2004: 4-11) covered 
much of this within the theory, stressing the important role played by income generating 
activities and the development of skills in the success and sustainability of a housing 
project. The economic benefits accruing to residents need to be affordable in terms of 
being given the means to re-pay the housing loan, and supportive by way of way of 
financially  and  socially  stimulating  the  community  –  both  of  which  are  void  in  this 
instance (Charlton, 2004: 4).  
However, the theoretical and practical stance adopted by Wehner (2000) and Oates 
(1994) would claim that local municipalities are best able to internalize the benefits of a 
public good or service. Niskanen behaviour is one possible explanation here with public 
officials,  even  in  the  presence  of  a  slow  institutional  transfer  of  money,  supporting 
inefficient and unplanned projects in an effort to exhaust (and hence maximize for the 
following year) their prescribed budget (Oates, 1994: 146). 
On the other hand, this juxtaposition (between theory and reality) can be attributed to 
challenges  surrounding  the  institutional  transfer  of  money  (Khanya-aicdd,  2008:  16). 
Structurally  speaking,  housing  within  the  Eastern  Cape  is  hierarchically  ordered 
underneath the provincial Bisho office (Khanya-aicdd, 2008: 16). Thus, all money which 
is  distributed  from  this  head  office  needs  to  pass  through  several  stringent  control 
mechanisms, leading to a number of bureaucratic delays and hold-ups. As a result, many 
of the smaller and local contractors (whose staff are recruited from the community and 
hence support local skills transfer) are unable to undertake any of the projects due to an 
insufficient  cash  flow  capacity  necessary  to  deal  with  payment  delays  (Khanya-aicdd, 
2008: 16). Hence, larger companies dominate the sector and permanent skilled staffs 
become a feature of their workforce. 
 
5. CASE STUDY: NGQUSHWA LOCAL MUNICIPALITY 
 
In terms of setting the scene, in 2007 the Ngqushwa local municipality was approximately 
19 380 houses in arrears (de Nobrega, 2007: 8). At the then current (2007) levels of 
delivery,  it  would  take  authorities  over  30  years  to  eradicate  this  backlog  (Budget 
Statement, 2007/08: 31). However, within the municipality itself a myriad of other issues 
combine to further stall housing delivery. Mcoseli (head of the housing unit at Peddie) 
highlighted the need for an investigation into why many beneficiaries have left structures 
empty  whilst  others  have  even  failed  to  complete  the  hand-over  process  and  take 
ownership of their RDP homes (de Nobrega, 2007: 10). 
Again, quality issues are a pertinent concern with structural defects marring many of 
the houses. Prud‟homme (1995: 208) attributes the failure to the focus in developing 
countries being on the satisfaction of a basic need (in this case housing) rather than on 
detailed taste and quality functions. The inability of local government to perform its 
redistributive and allocative role in line with these detailed taste and quality functions has 
led some beneficiaries, according to Mcoseli, to opt to remain within their existing homes 
as many of the houses are not watertight: “when it rained, water would come in through 




Nobrega, 2007: 10). Figures 4 and 5 depict the problem and reiterate why it makes little 
sense  for  residents  to  abandon  their  existing  homes  for  an  inferior  shelter  when 
possessions  within  the  house,  exposed  to  the  elements,  are  frequently  damaged  or 

















Figure 4: Cracked Wall and Unsecured Roof. Peddie, Eastern Cape. 


















Figure 5: Flawed Structures. Peddie, Eastern Cape. 
Source: de Nobrega, 2007: 12-13. 
 
Figure 6, an unvarnished and broken door, further highlights the quality concerns. 
However, keeping these structural defects in mind, Mcoseli mentioned that the Housing 
Department has ceased with many of the regular meetings, in effect closing down many 




contrast to Black et al’s (2005: 77) claim that politicians adopt popular as opposed to 
appropriate  policies,  this  behaviour  would  suggest  that  public  officials  within  the 



















Figure 6: Broken Door. Peddie, Eastern Cape. 
Source: de Nobrega, 2007: 12. 
 
Contrary to Prud‟homme‟s (1995: 208) claim that citizens are unable to express any 
dissatisfaction with local conditions by voting with their feet, the multi-year lifespan of 
housing projects and a lack of employment opportunities has led many of the registered 
beneficiaries  to  leave  the  area  (de  Nobrega,  2007:  16).  The  problem  is  further 
compounded  by  a  waiting  list  that  is  over-crowded  and  subject  to  bureaucratic 
corruption, leading in some instances to an additional waiting period of up to several 
years (de Nobrega, 2007: 16). There is thus evidence (in line with the arguments of Oates 
and Wehner) to suggest that the National Housing Department, and even the Provincial 
Department, is not the most efficient legislative and planning body in this regard as they 
are  both  distant  from  the  on-the-ground  reality.  In  short,  “although  National 
Government  has  an  overarching  responsibility  around  housing  matters,  the 
implementation of policies lies with the different spheres of government, thus making it 
impossible for National Government to determine where projects should be allocated 
and resources distributed” (Annual Report, 2006/07: 27). In order to properly illustrate 
the  magnitude  of  this  criticism,  a  United  Nations  Special  Rapporteur  on  Adequate 
Housing  stated  that  the  successful  delivery  of  housing  was  being  significantly 
compromised  by  the  fragmented  governmental  approach  to  the  implementation  of 
housing law and policy (Kothari, 2007). Mcoseli confirmed the problem, saying that she 
was  expected  to  comply  with  provincial  policies  regardless  of  resource  (capital  and 



















Rather than adopting unsustainable public policies as Fjeldstad (2001: 4) suggests, 
redistributive policies under the auspices of decentralization have been constrained by 
severe staff and skills shortages. The high vacancy rates, illustrated in figure 7, necessitates 
that  the  Provincial  Department  (which  is  itself  understaffed  and  overly  stretched) 
intervene within the municipality in order to compensate for the lack of local technical 
skills (de Nobrega, 2007: 18). The figure reveals that both general and critical (essential 
positions) vacancy rates are experiencing an upward trend, with significantly more than 
half the staff positions on both accounts left unfilled. The problem of under-capacity is 
thus exacerbated, with the municipality expected to act as a project developer with only 
one  person  employed  in  the  housing  unit  along  with  a  single  building  inspector  (de 
Nobrega, 2007: 19). Thus, rather than having to act as a fiscal lender of last resort the 
central  government  is  increasingly  called  upon  to  implement  economic  policy  and 
compensate for inadequacies by way of human capital rent. To sum this problem up the 
ideal ratio is one project manager to every five projects, however, the reality within the 
Eastern Cape (of which Ngqushwa municipality is a microcosm) is that the ratio is one 


















Figure 7: Trends in Eastern Cape Vacancy Rates: 2002/03 to 2006/07. 
Source: de Nobrega, 2007: 18. 
 
At  the  same  time,  housing  delivery  within  Ngqushwa  municipality  has  been 
compromised by widespread political interference. Ill-founded assumptions, red-tape, and 
bureaucratic failure have led policy developments, as Khan and Thurman (2001: 11-18) 
predicted,  to  ignore  the  effects  of  inflation,  increasing  land  values,  and  adequate 
infrastructure provision. Policy dictated that the projects should be preferentially awarded 
to  emerging  contractors  rather  than  established  ones,  despite  these  contractors often 
having unreliable methods of communication, heavy cash flow constraints, and a lack of 
skills and experience which all lead to the delayed completion of projects (de Nobrega, 
2007: 23). Along with this, emerging contractors are put under increased strain when the 




2005 the cost of building materials rose by 143% while the housing subsidy increased by 
less than 50% (National Department of Housing, 2006/07: 18-21). Rather than having 
the means to deal with these increased costs, emerging contractors have tended to (as 
seen in the above figures) take short-cuts at the expense of quality housing. 
Furthermore, a large percentage of the management and financial monitoring systems 
within the municipality appear either to be weak or non-existent. As Oates (1994: 129) 
made clear, the ability of local governments to effectively manage a public project (such 
as  housing)  pivots  around  central  government  establishing  a  set  of  necessary 
rules/parameters to guide the process.  de Nobrega (2007: 24-27) states that business 
plans, along with planning regulation and quality checks, were subject to inspection only 
post 2006 when an authoritative body was first established – many of the technicalities 
before then going overlooked. The Department has also been subject to repeated audit 
disclaimers as there has been inadequate monitoring of transfer payments. Developers 
within  the  municipality,  prior  to  the  handover  of  payments,  should  have  conducted 
thorough inspections of the project site in order to ensure compliance to quality and brief 
standards. 
Lastly,  there  is  little  to  no  coordination  between  the  Eastern  Cape  Housing 
Department  and  the  National  Housing  Department.  Rather  than  fiscal  responsibility 
taking  the  form  of  a  joint  state/sub-state  venture,  the  aims  and  expectations  of  the 
separate authoritative bodies have historically diverged. Whereas the national norm for 
subsidized housing was a gross floor area of 30m2 (for which the housing subsidy was 
intended),  the  Eastern  Cape  Department  demanded  a  minimum  floor  area  of  40m2 
(National  Department  of  Housing,  2006/07:  11).  Solomon  (2009:  1)  reiterates  this 
problematic breakdown between governmental tiers, arguing that the national housing 
subsidy of R16 000 was inadequate to cover costs over and above the standard design. 
Solomon (2009: 3) went on further to juxtapose conventional building costs of R3 000 
per m2 with the R400 per m2 available to government contractors. As a result, service 
quality  was  jeopardized  and  a  number  of  housing  structures  were  compromised  by 
contractors foregoing the placement of lintels – the horizontal beam or structure above a 
window  or  door  opening  that  supports  the  roof.  Without  the  necessary  funding  to 
undertake  such  operations  this  concern  has  repeatedly  appeared  as  a  major  barrier 
inhibiting the success of housing projects through undermining both construction time 
and quality. 
 
6. ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Contrary to the preceding case studies, several options exist as alternatives to the standard 
RDP housing formula. One such option explored by Del Monte (2009: 23-24) is social 
housing,  and  originates  from  the  idea  that  housing  should  be  an  asset  to  both  the 
individual and the authorities. This option is clearly exemplified through the Sakhasonke 
Housing Village Initiative, situated near Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape. The Village is 
a revolutionary low-cost housing alternative, drawing on economies of scale in order to 
provide quality and better located settlements. The houses (illustrated in figure 8) differ 
from traditional unit design and are a combination of duplex and triplex configurations. 
By doing this, contractors were able to make use of joint communal walls and services in 




within the Village itself the needs of the community have been met by installing paved 
walkways and green public spaces, creating a friendly and clean living environment. An 
evaluator  of  the  project,  after  completing  an  inspection,  described  the  Village  as 
“resembling  a  townhouse  complex  that  provides  security,  a  quality  and  healthy 




























Figure 8: Sakhasonke Village.  
Source: Del Monte, 2009: 25. 
 
Again, this medium density housing village has been more successful than low density 
alternatives  in  several  regards.  Table  5  reflects  these  benefits,  however,  the  most 
important of these is the ability to translate the reduced land and service costs into a 46m2 











Table 5: Comparative Project Costs. 
Project Costs  Low Density  Medium Density 
Professional Fees (R)  1 000  1 000 
Land Costs at R3/m2 (R)  687  219 
Services (R)  9 279  5 500 
Top Structure (R)  18 371  22 618 
Area of House (m2)  35  46 
Building Costs/m2 (R)  525  492 
Other Costs (R)  1 500  1 500 
Total (R)  30 837  30 837 
Source: Del Monte, 2009: 24. 
  
Further benefits are numerically captured by table 6.  The reduced land and service 
costs were also able to be re-channelled into realising an inclusive housing settlement. By 
increasing the number of housing units from 126 to 337 (on the same size land plo t), 
Sakhasonke has allowed for a number of residents who would otherwise have been 
confined to waiting lists to gain access to RDP housing. 
 
Table 6: Comparative Key Figures. 
Source: Del Monte, 2009: 24. 
  
But, more than this the Village has proven itself to be sustainable. Charlton (2004: 13) 
reiterates this point, highlighting the urgent need to link housing projects with the long -
term economic need of its beneficiaries. The beneficiaries have taken ownership of their 
new community and  established various community  programs  including a gardening 
service, a neighbourhood watch, and a crèche/pre-school facility (Del Monte, 2009: 24). 
These initiatives go beyond the delivery process and the short-medium term creation of 
jobs  in  the  construction  sector  –  in  effect  turning  a  massive  fiscal  project  into  a 
sustainable and beneficial economic and social asset (Charlton, 2004: 13). Sakhasonke, 
however, owes a lot of its success to the sound planning and vision that went into the 
development  of  the  Village  ensuring  its  proximity  to  economic  opportunities  and 
structural longevity. 
Most importantly, a number of key lessons can be taken from Sakhasonke Village. In 
line with Arrigone‟s (1994: 13) requirements the project is affordable for both state and 
the  relevant  target  income  group.  The  lowest  income  bracket  (R0  -  R1  500)  can  be 
offered  access  to  quality  housing  and  the  model  is  easy  to  replicate  in  a  variety  of 
environments and situations (The Social Housing Foundation, 2006: 7). Secondly, the 
success of a housing project is inextricably linked to sound long-term management and 
the  involvement  of  the  community  (allowing  beneficiaries  to  participate  and  take 
Key Figures  Low Density  Medium Density 
Area of Settlement (m2)  44 900  44 900 
Residential Area (net m2)  27 185  24 629 
Number of Houses  126  337 
Gross Residential Density (units/total 
area) 
28  75 
Net Residential Area 
(units/residential area) 
46  137 
Average House Size (m2)  35  46 
Population Potential (at 5 persons per 
house) 




ownership of their new communities). The housing in the Village is also flexible, being 
able to accommodate rental periods or other tenure agreements depending on the specific 
needs of the community (The Social Housing Foundation, 2006: 7). But, for a housing 
project  to  realize  these  points  it  is  essential  for  a  post  implementation  phase  to  be 
conducted in order to foster community programs and kick-start the economic and social 
livelihood of the community (The Social Housing Foundation, 2006: 7).  
Following, Overy (2005: 4) carefully details a number of other recommendations and 
findings. In order for the underspending complaint to be rectified it is necessary for 
municipalities  to  be  properly  capacitated  to  administer  their  budgets.  But,  without 
adequate  strategic  planning  and  a  demand  driven  framework  from  the  National 
Department  it  is  unlikely  that  funds  will  reach  either  the  regions  or  projects  which 
deserve/need them most. All levels of government, ranging from the Provincial Standing 
Committee  to  the  National  Department  of  Housing,  need  to  closely  monitor  their 
spending throughout the course of each financial year. 
Next, and equally important, Overy (2005: 4-5) highlights the need for national and 
provincial treasuries to ensure that all monies spent are in compliance with Treasury 
Regulation 15.10.1.2 (b) which requires that “transfer payments can only be made with 
due regard for efficient, effective, and economical programme delivery”. Any failure to 
comply with these terms when making transfer payments needs to be stamped out with 
the most effective way of doing through strict monitoring mechanisms. The monitoring 
mechanisms,  however,  should  extend  further  than  this  and  encompass  quality  and 
delivery checks as well. It is imperative that national norms and standards are adhered to, 
making sure that every home built and handed-over is a long-term asset rather than a 
financial burden. 
Overy (2005: 6) suggests the high staff vacancy rates should be dealt with through 
clearly posted job advertisements and easily accessible training programs. In addition to 
this, a staff retention strategy needs to be implemented in order to ensure mandates and 
delivery targets are met with ease and proficiency. If these critical posts can be filled, the 
funds saved on reduced consulting fees could be channelled into more beneficial aisles of 
spending in an effort to finally erode the escalating housing backlog. 
Finally, legislative accountability can be enforced by requiring departments to publish 
all  resolutions  and  committee  decisions  in  its  annual  report  (Overy,  2005:  7).  Any 
constitutional  violation should  be  quickly  acted  upon,  with  the  oversight  committees 
readily able to contact and criticize the MEC for Housing or any other authoritative 
figure (Overy, 2005: 7). Through this process poor planning and corruption can also be 
addressed through accurate report-backs and detailed (and easily available) press releases. 





In conclusion, comprehensive attention has been paid to many of the apparent barriers 
inhibiting the successful delivery of state housing within the Eastern Cape. In reality, 
although many of these factors are evident on a nation-wide scale it is important to keep 
in  mind  the  specific  geographical,  political,  social,  and  economic  independence  of 




The most significant issues appear to be informed by the theory of public finance and 
are largely structural in form. Amongst these, the ineffective breakdown of central and 
sub-national jurisdictions has led to a host of coordination and planning issues. Along 
with this, poorly functioning authoritative bodies have given rise to weak managerial 
capacity, high vacancy rates, the unsustainability of projects and a lack of skills transfer 
and project oversight. 
In  order  to  further  explain  the  unfulfilled  policy  aims  and  political  visions, 
development economics helps to explore the inability of local municipalities to translate 
finance budgets into tangible housing development and infrastructure growth. The quality 
and relevance of completed housing projects has been overlooked, this again largely due 
to issues of bureaucratic and fiscal failure. Furthermore, under-staffed departments have 
chosen to focus on a supply-driven delivery framework, reporting on quantitative (as 
opposed to qualitative) figures and neglecting specific high-need areas and populations. 
Both human and capital constraints are evident throughout the government structure 
(national, provincial and local), serving to significantly undermine the bodies which are 
entrusted with the provision of housing. Subsequent inefficiencies have arisen, however, 
the absence of reliable payment and fiscal distribution channels are amongst the most 
important.  This results  in  the  larger  and  more  efficient  contractors  opting  to  pursue 
alternative  tenders,  leaving  emerging  contractors  and  local  developers  as  the  only 
available choice. These small-scale local companies do not have the financial backing to 
deal with payment delays, and as such overdue payments (which stem from a centralized 
housing  system  based  in  Bisho)  lead  contractors  to  undercut  building  standards  and 
sacrifice quality in an attempt to reduce costs and maintain their profit margins. 
An overview of the housing delivery value chain and the actual functions performed 
by the specific role-players therein highlight the issues of bureaucratic failure, red tape, 
and wide-spread corruption – once again characteristic of the literature on public finance. 
At first glace these failures are evident through the high proportion of blocked, delayed, 
or discontinued projects. Corruption is rife in the hand-over and supervision process, 
leading many of the completed projects to be characterized by inferior quality and in need 
of substantial repair costs. 
The  residents  within  these  municipalities  suffer  as  a  result  of  the  slow  housing 
delivery. Efforts therefore need to be made to better deliver on the political promises and 
constitutional rights of citizens. Social housing projects, as seen through the example of 
Sakhasonke  Village,  offer  themselves  as  potential  alternatives  to  the  traditional  RDP 
housing projects. Through cost-cutting methods derived from economies of scale, the 
firm establishment of a community,  and comprehensive planning aimed at economic 
sustainability,  Sakhasonke  Village  has  seemingly  been  able  to  overcome  many  of  the 
barriers  which  consistently  plague  housing  delivery  within  the  province.  Other 
recommendations were offered, however, it seems that the immediate point of departure 
needs  to  be  the  development  of  adequate  supervision,  staffing,  communication  and 
reporting mechanisms on a municipal, provincial, and countrywide scale. 
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